Dossier: Too big to fail

Due to the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, large and globally connected financial institutions had to be rescued by the state in many places throughout the world. To prevent this from happening in Switzerland in the future, parliament has introduced targeted regulation. Implementation of the relevant provisions is under way.
From the Annual Report 2018

“Too big to fail” – the long road to the orderly resolvability

Struktur

A systemically important bank fulfils one or more key functions in the economy whose failure or unavailability would cause serious disruption to the financial system and have a knock-on impact on the real economy.

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From the Annual Report 2018

Overview of recovery and resolution

Zuständigkeiten

The ongoing work of the systemically important banks on their recovery and emergency plans was the main focus at FINMA in 2018.

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From the Annual Report 2015

Further development of the Swiss “too big to fail” legislation

Eigenmittel

Switzerland again played a leading role in 2015 responding to challenges related to financial institutions that are “too big to fail”. In October, the Federal Council decided to introduce higher capital requirements for global systemically important Swiss banks by the end of 2019 and to accelerate the implementation of emergency plans.

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From the Annual Report 2014

Progress on resolving the “too big to fail” issue

tbtf

Further key measures to improve the resolvability of global systemically important banks were launched internationally in 2014. Credit Suisse Group and UBS are adjusting their group structures accordingly.

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From the Annual Report 2014

At a glance: the TLAC concept

tlac

The FSB has been instructed by the G-20 to develop the total loss-absorbing capacity concept for global systemically important banks. A public consultation was launched in November 2014.

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From the Annual Report 2013

Resolution strategy

Sanierung

The core element of FINMA’s resolution strategy for globally active systemically important banks is that creditors should be compelled to bear a share of the losses. This bail-in reduces the implicit state guarantee and restores order to the market.

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